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Abstract 
Using data covering 3 election moments (1988-2000) for 294 Flemish municipalities we examine whether the 
decision to cut tariffs before elections depends on the government’s expectations of staying into office. Election 
moments are central to both the political budget cycle literature and the strategic debt models. The combination of 
both theories could suggest that, at least in theory, both winning and loosing governments seem to benefit from pre-
electoral tariff reductions and as such we expect to find a great many municipalities to engage into tariff cuts. The 
dataset however shows this is clearly not the case.  We argue that the differences in the fiscal policy reaction of 
governments facing elections might have to do with their expectations of staying into office.  In our analysis we 
make the decision to change tariffs dependent on the expected vote percentage of the government party (parties). As 
we do not possess reliable ex ante data on the perceived re-election probability, we estimate a vote-function to 
predict the percentage of votes. Our analysis shows that tariff reductions in election years are more prone when 
governments expect not to reach majority again in next elections.  
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper deals with the question whether the expectation of getting voted out of office 
is linked to the incumbent government’s tax policy in the election year.  The paper joins ideas 
from 3 different literatures: the budget cycles literature, the strategic debt models and the studies 
concerning the choice of tax tariffs.  
The study of the politicians’ behaviour at election moments is the central focus of the 
electoral cycle models (Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978), Hibbs (1977) and Rogoff (1990)). An 
impressive amount of studies have been testing various predictions coming from political 
business or fiscal cycles models. The findings are of particular importance for the analysis done 
in this paper, as we are investigating the effect of elections on the local tax policy of Flemish 
municipalities.  We focus on fiscal policy, rather than on economic policy as the evidence 
concerning budget cycles seems much more robust (Franzese, 2002).  
Next to the electoral cycle literature, we rely on insights from the strategic debt models 
(Persson & Svensson (1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990)). In these models incumbents are 
consciously engaging in deficit spending or debt accumulation, the aim being to jeopardize the 
fiscal stance of the next government. The models suggest that incumbents are triggered to do so 
when today’s government fears to be voted out of office at the next elections. According to the 
strategic debt models, the perceived probability of defeat thus might be a key parameter in 
explaining policy choices preceding election moments. In our contribution we examine whether 
the probability of being a member of the next majority somehow determines the tariff changes 
of local taxes in election years. Unfortunately we do not possess data on the perceived chances 
of re-election resulting from surveys or face-to-face interviews. Instead of working with post 
election results concerning the effective vote distribution (see Petterson-Lidbom, 2001), we use 
the outcomes of an estimated vote function. As such, the expected votes are depending on the 
actual popularity of the government, on its fiscal policy and on the economic conditions. 
Additionally we adopt variables reflecting the institutional framework of local elections. As 
more recent contributions (Goodhart (2002), Ashworth & Heyndels (2002), Nelson (2000), 
Huber et al. (2003) and recently Geys (2007)) are suggesting, we expect government 
fragmentation to affect the opportunity to electioneer. 
Finally, only a limited number of electoral cycles studies focus on tax policy. Most of the 
time expenditures, deficits or debt are the fiscal instruments under study (see Rogoff (1990), 
Alesina et. al (1992), de Haan & Sturm (1997), Schuknecht (2000), Brender & Drazen (2005), 
Alt & Lassen (2006), Mink & de Haan (2006)). Yet, scholars generally agree that incumbents 
prefer to manipulate the instruments the most visible to their electorate. As tariff changes are 
highly visible (cfr. Mickesell (1978)), the dependent variable in this study is representing the 
relative tariff changes of the local income tax in the election year. This surcharge tax is levied 
by almost every local community. It collects almost 40% of total local government fiscal income 
(Dexia, 2006) and tariff cuts are affecting the majority of taxpayers.  
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To test whether vote expectations explain fiscal policy choices, we use panel data 
covering 3 election moments (1988, 1994, 2000) for 294 Flemish local governments. Vote 
expectations are generated first, starting from the vote function estimated by Vermeir & 
Heyndels (2006), which we slightly adapted for the purpose. Next, fixed and random effects 
models were tested. Next to the key variable, we introduce variables representing scale, 
budgetary position and government fragmentation. The results indicate that the expectation of 
being a member of the next majority is indeed related to the magnitude of the local income tax 
tariff cuts.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review. Section 3 formulates our research question and hypothesis. Section 4 presents the 
dataset, the model and the results of the empirical analysis. Finally some concluding comments 
are given in section 5. 
  
2. Literature 
The propositions made in this paper are related to some well-established models in the 
fiscal policy literature. In this section we briefly discuss the contributions of political business 
and budget cycle models and strategic debt models. 
 
Political business/budget cycles 
Political business cycle models expect incumbents when facing elections to engage in 
specific policies. Originally the models focussed on politicians stimulating the economy by 
manipulating macro-economic policy (political business cycles). By taking employment or 
wealth inducing measures, the government’ s popularity, and as a consequence its chance of 
staying in office was expected to increase. Still, Drazen (2000) concludes that models based on 
manipulating the economy via monetary policy are unconvincing both theoretically and 
empirically. However, studies studying fiscal policy (political budget cycles − PBC) are much 
more robust. A lot of empirical evidence is supporting the idea that lowering taxes, increasing 
expenditures or raising grants before elections could raise the government’ s chance of re-
election. A general overview of the theory of PBC can be found in e.g. Franzese (2002) or 
Drazen (2000). 
After Nordhaus (1975) several generations of political economists were attracted by the 
idea of political cycles.  Their contributions are the result of changing assumptions about the 
incumbents’  motivation or about the voter’ s attitude. Incumbents are expected to be 
opportunistic or partisan. Whereas opportunistic politicians are primarily driven by the desire to 
retain office and care little about policies or outcomes, the politicians featuring in partisan 
models exhibit strong ideological differences. Concerning the voters, later models assume them 
to act in an adaptive way or to be rationally voting citizens. Adaptive voters are retrospective 
voters. Their expectations about the future policy are determined by past policy. Rational voters 
on the contrary, are rather concerned about the impact of their vote after the election. Based on 
the combination of these different types of incumbents and voters Alesina (1988) discerns four 
generations of models.   
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The first generation of models refers to Nordhaus (1975) or Tufte (1978). These models 
assume backward looking voters and opportunistic, office-seeking incumbents. These politicians 
adopt expansionary policies –regardless of political ideology– in the later year(s) of their term in 
office to stimulate the economy. While Nordhaus (1975) focuses on macroeconomic policies 
incumbents pursue to maximize their votes, Tufte (1978) stresses electoral cycles in directly 
manipulatory policies, such as transfer payments, to buy votes from myopic voters. Voters, 
being the victims of fiscal illusion, do not take the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government into account. By consequence they are overestimating the benefits of recent policy 
and underestimating the resulting future fiscal burden.  
Contrary to Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) Hibbs (1977, 1987) believes incumbents 
to be driven by partisan or ideological objectives. As in the first generation models, voters are 
expected to judge retrospectively. In Hibbs’  models (1977, 1987) incumbents contest and voters 
adjudicate elections in partisan terms. Elections are thus ideological driven. Incumbents will try 
to earn a reputation that attracts voters in accordance with their ideology. Incumbents of the 
right favour low taxes, prefer low inflation to low unemployment and are sensitive to balanced 
budgets, the opposite being assumed for left wing voters.  
In third generation models incumbents are office-seeking, while voters are expected to 
have rational expectations. As such they are not easily to be deceived over long periods. We 
refer to the models of Cukierman & Meltzer (1986), Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). 
A central issue here is whether voters are able to observe the incumbent’ s competence level. 
While each candidate is assumed to know his own level of competency, voters are uncertain 
about the competency of the incumbents. Voters want to elect the most competent politician and 
form rational expectations about the incumbents’  competency based on observable current fiscal 
policy outcomes. With the objective of raising re-election probability incumbents can signal 
their competency by e.g. cutting taxes or rising easily observed spending before elections. If 
voters enjoy the benefits of these policies before they can evaluate the full cost of them, 
incumbents will try to signal or feign their competency transferring the bills to post-election 
moments. According to Alesina (1989, 63) the budgetary process is sufficiently complicated, to 
reasonably expect even relatively informed and attentive voters to be fooled at least temporarily. 
Finally Alesina (1987, 1988), Alesina & Rosenthal (1995) and Alesina et al. (1997) 
create a model in which partisan incumbents try to attract rational or prospective voters. Their 
models extend the ideas of the third generation models, but next to the incumbent’ s competence, 
elections outcome now is uncertain too. In these models voters could foresee what leftist or 
rightist governments would bring about, but they don’ t know the outcome of elections.  
A great many of empirical analyses have been testing the propositions resulting from 
PBC models, but evidence is mixed. Franzese (2002) points out that support for electoral cycles 
is less robust in developed countries relative to developing democracies. Secondly, the context 
(political, economic, institutional, structural as well as strategic) in which incumbents operate 
determinate the incentives to ‘electioneer’ . Finally, policy adjustments (i.e. budgets, 
expenditures, taxes, investments) to influence the voter’ s decision-making are relatively well-
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established while evidence for pre-electoral shifts in real outcomes (i.e. gross domestic product, 
inflation or unemployment) is at best ambiguous1. 
In this paper we look for evidence of an electoral cycle in pre-electoral tax policy in a 
local context. The setting of local governments excludes monetary policy as an instrument for 
pre-electoral opportunistic behaviour. Monetary policy is the exclusive power of the federal 
government, which through its central bank is represented in the ECB decision-making bodies. 
At the local level, changes in fiscal policy are expected to have a more significant impact on 
voters’  behaviour. We refer to Drazen (2000) who arguments that fiscal policy can clearly signal 
the government’ s competence to the electorate. More specifically we will focus on the most 
visible part of the local fiscal policy, namely tariff changes of important local taxes.   
 
Strategic debt models 
Strategic debt models were introduced by Persson & Svensson (1989). Their research 
question is quite clear : suppose that the current government knows that it will be replaced in the 
future by a new government with different objectives, then how will this affect the current 
government’ s behaviour? In particular, will the current government run fiscal deficits when it 
knows that its successor’ s choice of public spending will be influenced by the level of public 
debt that the successor inherits? Do incumbent policy makers run higher budget deficits than 
they would have, if they were certain to be re-elected? In their theoretical paper Persson & 
Svensson (1989) formulate a positive answer on this last question.  
The influential paper of Persson & Svensson (1989) was followed by the contributions of 
Alesina & Tabellini (1990). Both papers emphasize strategic considerations concerning the 
government’ s debt policy, yet from another point of view. While Persson & Svensson (1989) 
focus on the level of spending, Alesina & Tabellini (1990) concentrate on the composition of 
government spending.  
Persson & Svensson (1989) argue that voters have heterogeneous preferences relative to 
the size of the government. Some of the voters want the government to provide some level of 
expenditures, while others prefer more of those expenditures to be provided privately. The 
incumbents reflect the voters’  preferences and act accordingly. If the more conservative (in the 
sense of being less expansionary) incumbents anticipate to be replaced after next elections, 
Persson & Svensson (1989) expect them to run a higher budget deficit. The idea is to reduce the 
future public spending opportunities of the following (more liberal) government. The opposite is 
true for more liberal incumbents that are traditionally less reluctant to higher public 
expenditures. Persson & Svensson (1989) argue that more liberal incumbents will borrow less 
when convinced that they will be succeeded by a more conservative government.  
Alesina & Tabellini (1990) assume that governments differ with respect to their 
preferences concerning the composition of government spending. Again this is a reflection of 
the voters’  preferences. When the government knows it will be replaced, the leaving government 
                                                 
1
 It is not difficult to see that it is for incumbents much easier to manipulate policy instruments than macroeconomic 
outcomes (e.g. GDP, inflation or unemployment). Governments are able control their own policy instruments whereas 
they can only hope to have some indirect impact on the economy (Blais & Nadeau, 1992, 390). 
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will create debt in order to spend a lot of money on the policies in line with their voters’  
preferences. This can be seen as an advance on the spending cut on those preferences that will 
coincide with the take-over of the next government. The marginal cost of repaying the additional 
debt will fall on the policies which matter most for the new government, but are unimportant to 
the electorate of the leaving government. Alesina & Tabellini (1990) conclude that the 
equilibrium level of public debt tends to be larger the more likely it is that the current 
government will not be re-appointed.  
Martimort (2001) extends the frameworks of Svensson & Persson (1989) and Alesina & 
Tabellini (1990) by stressing the strategic role of budget deficits when parties differ only with 
respect to their redistributive concerns. According to Martimort (2001) political regime 
switching introduces fluctuations of the distribution of utilities in the economy. These 
fluctuations justify strategic budget distortions by governments currently holding office and 
willing to favour their redistributive concerns against future majority. Based on his theoretical 
model Martimort (2001) expects leftist governments to create distortions by means of deficits, 
while rightist governments are expected to create surpluses. These theoretical expectations are 
contrary to those of Persson & Svensson (1989).  
Empirical research by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) is consistent with the model of Persson 
& Svensson (1989). Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) examines the accumulation of debt by Swedish 
local governments. He finds that right-wing governments accumulate more debt when facing 
higher probability of defeat, whereas the opposite occurs for left-wing governments.  
Other empirical studies by Lambertini (2003) and Franzese (2001) do not support the 
strategic use of deficits idea. Both examine data concerning OECD-countries. According to 
Sutter (2003) the insignificance of the results of both papers may have been caused by problems 
associated with the pooling of cross-country data.  
Finally, we refer to Sutter (2003), who relied on experimental design to test the strategic 
debt model propositions.  Sutter (2003) states that ceteris paribus, deficits decrease with a higher 
probability of being re-elected.  
All studies cited so far are referring to budget deficits primarily driven by conscious 
increases in public expenditures. In this paper we use the strategic debt models from another 
point of view. Creating a deficit can also be the result of decreasing revenues, while keeping 
expenditures constant of letting them grow even further. In this contribution we specifically 
focus on this revenue site of the budget and estimate a tax tariff function. 
 
3. Discussion 
 
We belief this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we explain local 
pre-electoral tax policy by introducing the perceived probability of getting into office again. 
Whether an incumbent decides to manipulate tariffs or other fiscal instruments, is depending on 
the perceived need to take visible actions on the eve of elections. This is in line with Tufte’ s 
(1978) statement that electoral cycles require opportunity and motive. Cyclical behaviour 
becomes more likely when there is political ability to manipulate policy and when it is more 
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needed. In the strategic debt models this need is formulated in a rather definitive way. The 
government will engage in deficit-spending or accumulate debt when “the government knows 
that it will be replaced” (Persson & Svensson, 1989 : 325). In this paper, we mitigate this 
assumption, stating that uncertainty about getting re-elected is already sufficient to act 
strategically. We refer to Rogoff (1990, 30) who explicitly states that “the prospect of being able 
to run for re-election again raises the temptation to distort fiscal policy”. Additionally, it should 
be noted that we do not take the viewpoint of individual politicians. Rather we focus on the 
position of the seated majority. We investigate whether expectations about being a member of 
the next majority might be a decisive factor in the process. 
Secondly, the paper contributes to the relatively limited empirical evidence concerning 
incumbents’  strategic behaviour at a local government level. We are only aware of the 
Pettersson-Lidbom-study (2001) which goes into the debt accumulation of Swedish local 
governments. The same goes for the PBC.2 Except for Geys (2007), Drazen & Eslava (2005), 
Binet & Pentecôte (2004), Veiga & Veiga (2007) and Brender (2003), country level data 
dominate in PBC literature. Yet a local-level context offers a number of advantages. Flemish 
municipalities share common political and constitutional systems, experience common 
economic shocks, employ similar budgetary processes, have identical electoral rules and voter 
preferences are reasonably homogeneous across municipalities. Unlike studies using country 
data, we are able to control for institutional aspects and economic conditions that have been 
found in the literature to play an important role in determining fiscal policy choices. An 
additional advantage is related to the number of cases in the analysis. Municipal data allow 
testing panel data models with a much larger number of observations. Finally, the pertinency to 
look at Flemish local governments from the angles taken by the political budget cycle or 
strategic debt models is supported by the recent study by Geys (2007). This paper clearly 
demonstrates that the level of political fragmentation affects both the need for and possibility to 
engage in opportunistic policy cycles. Though we are both examining local government 
behaviour, our approach differs from that used in the Pettersson-Lidbom-study. The Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001) ‘probability of defeat’ -variable was reconstructed on the basis of the election 
outcomes. In this paper we rely on the large literature on vote and popularity functions. Instead 
of working with the actual post election results, we estimate a specific vote function. We assume 
that the expected votes are depending on the current popularity of the government, on its fiscal 
policy and on the economic conditions. Additionally we adopt variables reflecting the local 
institutional framework. As the contributions of Goodhart (2002), Ashworth & Heyndels (2002), 
Nelson (2000), Huber et al. (2003) and recently Geys (2007) are suggesting, we expect 
government fragmentation to affect the opportunity to electioneer. 
                                                 
2
 Drazen & Eslava (2005) find a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of 
other types of expenditures in Colombian municipalities in the period 1987-2000. Binet & Pentecôte (2004) show 
that election-motivated tax manipulation in French municipalities can be done by tariff cuts. Veiga & Veiga (2007) 
find that expenditures of Portuguese municipalities over the 1979-2000 period increase in pre-election periods, 
especially on items that are highly visible to the electorate (e.g., highways and streets). Brender (2003) shows that 
fiscal performance of Israeli mayors substantially affected their re-election probability in the 1998 campaign, but 
not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns. 
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Finally, we would like to point to the fact that this paper is investigating tariff cuts. Tariff 
changes as such very rarely are the dependent variable in PBC research. We are only acquainted 
with the research of Mikesell (1978), Nelson (2000) and Binet & Pentecôte (2004)3. Tax rates 
defined as tax revenues as a share of GDP are more common.4 Tax revenues are another 
measure in the study of the political manipulation of tax policy.5 Such data may be a less 
accurate reflection of elected officials’  intentions, as taxes paid also reflect economic conditions. 
We are convinced that in for the panel of Flemish local authorities it is more convenient to look 
for tariff changes. The tax under research is a surcharge tax of which each municipality has to 
set its own tariff (including 0) while the tax base is based on the same legislation. Consequently, 
voters can easily compare their hometown tariff with those of neighbouring municipalities or 
municipalities with the same characteristics.6 This makes a pre-electoral tariff cut an ideal 
instrument for incumbents to signal their competence prior to elections.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we empirically asses whether the prospects of electoral outcome are 
decisive in pre-electoral tax policy.  Section 4.1 familiarizes the unacquainted reader with some 
crucial characteristics of Flemish local governments and their functioning. Section 4.2 outlines 
our dependent variable. Section 4.3 presents the methodology and the empirical model. Finally 
section 4.4 discusses the empirical results. 
 
4.1 Institutional context 
In this empirical part of the paper we use a panel data set covering the period 1988 to 
2000, containing 294 (of the 308) Flemish municipalities, capturing 3 election moments. 
Flemish local governments have a parliamentary system consisting of the local council 
(the legislative body) and the College of Mayor and Alderman (the executive body). Seats in the 
council are allocated using a system of proportional representation (PR)7. The composition of 
the College is determined by the party (or parties) holding a majority position in the council. 
                                                 
3
 Mikesell (1978) shows that tariff cuts in American states have been concentrated in the latter years of the electoral 
cycle in the period 1960-1977. Tariff increases on the contrary are more likely to occur in the year immediately 
after election years than in election years. Working on a similar but larger dataset (1946-1993) Nelson (2000) 
affirmed the occurrence of tariff increases, while he finds little evidence that U.S. state politicians strategically time 
tariff cuts to occur around election periods. Binet & Pentecôte (2004) show that tariff cuts are used for election-
motivated tax manipulation in French municipalities. 
4
 To name only two of them Bizer & Durlauf (1990) demonstrate that average tax rates follow a pattern consistent 
with a political tax cycle and van der Ploeg (1989) shows that a government cuts the tax rate towards election eve in 
order to gain votes. 
5
 Poterba (1994) finds tax increases to be significantly smaller in election years than at other times. Yoo (1998) 
shows that Japanese tax revenues decrease with a statistically significant amount in the year immediately before the 
elections of the House of Representatives. 
6
 The theory on yardstick competition suggests that this comparison influences inhabitants in their votes (Besley & 
Case, 1995) 
7
 In a system of proportional representation (PR) each party is allocated a certain number of seats in proportion to 
the votes it obtains in the elections 
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Our setting is likely to be sensitive to opportunistic political business cycles and strategic debt 
models. Firstly, elections are held every 6 years at the second Sunday of October so election 
moments are planned. Secondly, incumbents can be indefinitely re-elected (i.e. there are no 
binding term limits), giving them the opportunity to carefully prepare their re-election strategy. 
Thirdly, systems of proportional representation are well established to be inherently more 
unstable than pluralist electoral systems (Duverger, 1954/1972). As such opportunistic and 
strategic policies become more tempting. 
Flemish municipalities enjoy a far-reaching autonomy in their fiscal policies. Besides 
taxation, grants from higher levels of government (which are for the most part unconditional) 
and dividends from municipal associations are the most important sources of revenue. Taxation, 
the focal point of the current paper, generates approximately half of the Flemish municipalities’  
revenues. Over four fifths of this tax income derives from surcharge taxes on regional and 
federal taxes on immovable property (i.e. the local property tax – LPT) and labour income (i.e. 
the local income tax – LIT). Higher governments define both tax bases while the local Councils 
are free to set any tax rate (including 0).8 LPT and LIT rates are voted by the Council in which 
the parties of the College have a majority. 
 
4.2 Dependent variable 
Mostly budgetary variables as expenditures, transfers, surplus/deficit and debt are used 
to prove a political budget cycle.9 But also revenue information and more specific tax revenue 
information can be helpful explaining cycling behaviour. In this paper the dependent variable of 
the (second) analysis will be tariff changes of the local income tax in election years. By cutting 
tariffs before elections, the government could give the voter the impression that it works 
efficient since expenditures can be paid with a reduced tax burden.  
From the PBC-perspective, we expect incumbents to lower tariffs when it is doubtful that 
it will get a majority of the votes at the next election. If the government anticipates reaching 
nearly 50% of the votes, reducing tariffs might just be an opportunistic action aimed at bringing 
in the necessary additional votes. If on the contrary the government, whatever policy followed to 
gain additional votes, expects not to get the majority of the votes, it can decide to act 
strategically and reduce the tax burden to saddle the next government with higher debts. The 
latter being in line with the strategic debt models. 
The PBC-point of view suggests that both winning and loosing incumbents profit from 
lowering taxes. Additional votes strengthen the power of the government. Still, we assume that 
                                                 
8
 However, besides the surcharge taxes mentioned above, municipalities also collect local taxes of which they set 
the tax base as well as the tax rate. In fact, the average Flemish municipality collects about 15 of such taxes and the 
most ‘exotic’  taxes can be found among the more than 120 local taxes that are currently in use: taxes on private 
swimming pools, on balconies, on transportation of drunken persons, on dogs, boats and so on. 
9
 Blais & Nadeau (1992) show that spending is increased in election years in Canadian provinces. Alesina (1988) 
finds a significant election year increase in net transfer over GNP for the U.S. Shi & Svensson (2003) consider a 
panel data set of 91 countries and find that in an election year the government surplus falls significantly. Brender & 
Drazen (2005) look for budget cycles using expenditures, transfers and the balance in a large cross-section of 
countries. Geys’  (2007) analysis of local public debt data for 296 Flemish municipalities provides empirical support 
for opportunistic policy cycles. 
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local governments being sure of succeeding themselves will not engage in such policies.10 We 
argue that the marginal cost of this action in the post-election period is larger than the marginal 
benefits in the year preceding elections. The decision by the current government to cut a tariff 
would reduce their scope for policymaking during next legislature.   
There is no doubt that tariff changes are visible and strong. Wagner (1971) already 
mentioned that tariff changes are a relatively visible form of tax legislation changes to voters. 
Tariff changes get public attention, legislative debate and voter attention (Mikesell, 1978), but 
possibly the strongest effect is that, ceteris paribus, all voters experience a reduced tax demand. 
Tariff cuts thus meet the condition Tufte (1978) stipulates that a measure to manipulate vote 
behaviour ‘must yield clear and immediate economic benefits to a large number of voters’ . 
Other modifications of the tax laws (tax base changes, additional exemptions,…) tend to be less 
visible, are not always well understood by the general public (Nelson, 2000) and rarely reduce 
tax demand by all taxpayers. 
2XUDQDO\VLVH[SODLQVWDULIIFKDQJHVRI/,7 /,7it) in election years. Vermeir & Heyndels 
(2006) show in their research on the electoral cost of tax policy in Flemish municipalities that 
the level of both the LIT and the LPT rate have a negative influence on the vote for the 
government parties, which shows that Flemish voters are sensible to tax policy changes. In this 
study we only use tariff cuts on LIT as the dependent variable of the analysis. Tax cuts of LIT 
are more appropriate as they are highly visible since all voters benefit from LIT tariff cuts, while 
only proprietors favor from LPT tariff cuts11. Ashworth & Heyndels (2000) show that local 
politicians indeed prefer changes of the LIT to realize a fall in tax revenue.12 Compared to other 
local taxes, LIT does not differ between municipalities except for the tariff as its tax base is 
defined by national procedures and regulations. Other local taxes vary in frequency and have 
individual municipal tax codes which make it difficult to compare municipalities. 
The dependent variable (of our second estimation) /,7it is the relative change of the local 
income tax rate in year t compared to year t-1. Positive values indicate tariff increases, while 
negative values refer to tariff cuts.  
                                                 
10
 In his research on tax-mimicking in Spanish municipalities Solé Ollé (2003) also expects that governments facing 
high a priori probabilities of re-election do not care all that much about the impact of fiscal policy changes on votes. 
11
 LPT is due by proprietors only. Renters are no property taxes indebted so they don’ t benefit from LPT cuts. 
Proprietors on the other hand can be domiciled elsewhere and thus not be entitled to vote and reward the 
government for reducing LPT. Compared to LIT reductions, LPT cuts are less interesting for politicians to gain 
votes in next elections. 
12
 Ashworth & Heyndels (2000, 126) questioned 637 local politicians (48% of population) about how they would 
realise a given fall in tax revenue. They show that 59,5% of the respondents would realize this by lowering the LIT, 
while only 8,8% would prefer reducing the LPT. 26,2% would reduce both taxes and only 5,5% would lower other 
local taxes. 
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4.3 Empirical model  
In this section we present our empirical model. Our model contains two regressions. First 
we estimate a vote function. Secondly the estimated vote percentage that results from the vote 
function is used as explanatory variable to explain pre-electoral tariff cuts /,7it). The second 
regression will focus on our research question and will show whether or not pre-electoral tax 
behaviour depends on the government’ s prospects of the electoral result. Prospects of the 
electoral result have already been used by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) to explain debt policy. If 
we follow his model to explain pre-electoral tariff policy in Flemish municipalities, we could 
explain /,7it in election years as a function of the incumbent’ s probability of electoral defeat 
(Dit). More formally, 
 
LITit = 0 + 1 Dit + 2 Yit + uit ;  (1) 
 
where i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994 and 2000   
 
Dit is the pre-electoral estimation of the incumbent’ s probability of electoral defeat, Yit is a 
vector of variables affecting fiscal policy and uit is an error term. Index i denotes local 
governments and index t election years 1988, 1994 and 2000.  
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) uses ex post election outcome as a proxy variable to estimate the 
probability of electoral defeat (Dit). To correct for endogeneity and measurement error problems 
associated with the proxy he uses an instrumental variable approach. The set of instrumental 
variables is restricted to historic vote results and the frequency of previous government changes.  
Still we believe that other variables, like economic, other political and tax variables can 
have an impact on upcoming electoral results. We refer to what has been studied intensively in 
the literature on vote functions. In general these functions explain the vote (or the change in the 
vote) for the government at elections by (the change in) economic, political and tax variables 
(Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). Mughan (1987, 198) even makes clear that the primary purpose of 
vote functions should be forecasting –“ predicting the outcome of an event before it occurs” – in 
stead of explaining. If these vote functions indeed give the government an indication of 
upcoming election results, they can tune their tax behaviour to them. Since the vote percentage 
the current government receives at next elections is the principal condition for their 
continuation, we take the expected vote percentage as explanatory variable in our model to 
explain pre-electoral fiscal policy. Of course the continuation of the government depends on the 
final electoral results.  
Our model is based on the Pettersson-Lidbom model, but we replace his crucial variable 
−probability of electoral defeat (Dit)− by the predicted values resulting from a variant of 
Vermeir & Heyndels’  (2006) vote function for Flemish municipalities13. This vote function 
takes besides ex post election outcome also economic and fiscal variables into account. In this 
paper we estimate a new vote function that comparing to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) leaves out 
                                                 
13
 Vermeir & Heyndels’  (2006) vote function model for Flemish municipalities shows empirical evidence for 
yardstick voting. 
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tax variables to avoid econometric problems in the second regression of our model.14 Equation 
(2) estimates the vote percentage of the government party (or parties15) in Flemish 
municipalities: 
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6−
=  α0 + α1 
[ ]tt
itV
,6
6
−
−
+ α2 EXPit + α3 NEXPit + α4 INCit + α5 UNEMPLit + α6 NPARit + 
year dummies + uit   (2) 
 
where:  i = 1,..., N; t = election years  
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6− represents the vote percentage obtained at election year t in municipality i by the 
party (or parties) that was (were) in government over the previous legislature. The vote 
percentage of the same party (parties) six years before in the previous elections ( [ ]ttitV ,66−− ) is 
introduced to control for the possible existence of an ‘incumbency advantage’ , that suggests that 
once in power, it becomes more difficult to lose the support gained from the public. [ ]ttitV
,6
6
−
−
 is 
expected to have a positive impact on the number of votes.16 Per capita expenditures (EXPit) are 
included to measure for the quantity (and/or quality) of public output. A positive impact on the 
votes is expected. We refer to the theory of yardstick voting to include also the average per 
capita expenditures of the neighbouring municipalities (NEXPit).17 Here a negative sign is 
expected. As literature on economic voting suggests that governments are held accountable for 
economic developments18, income per capita (INCit) and unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) are 
introduced. Income is expected to have a positive effect on votes, while the opposite is true for 
unemployment. Political characteristics enter vote function (2) through the number of 
government parties (NPARit) measuring for clearity of responsability. More coalition partners 
are expected to reduce the transparency. Fragmented governments are thus held less accountable 
for positive and negative developments (Powell & Whitten, 1993). As governments are more 
punished for negative developments than they are rewarded for positive developments, 
Nicholson & Segura (2002) show that fragmented governments generally suffer smaller 
                                                 
14
 The introduction of the tarriffs in the vote function would cause econometric problems as the second regression  
estimates tarrif changes and introduces the predicted value of the vote function, which would capture the impact of 
the tariffs, as explanatory variable.  
15
 The vote share corresponds with the sum of the share of the coalition partners in the case of coalition 
governments. 
16
 Remark that this lagged term implies that the dataset does not contain data of all Flemish municipalities. 
Sometimes it is impossible to calculate previous election results of the government. Parties may split up, merge 
with another party or change their names. Also parties can disappear and not compete in next elections or a member 
of the government can change parties. The dataset that corresponds with that of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) only 
contains observations of which previous election results can be undisputebly calculated. We thus are confronted 
with an unbalanced panel as we do not have observations for every election in every municipality. Finally our 
dataset contains 688 observations of 294 (out of 308) municipalities. 
17
 The theory on yardstick competition suggests that voters compare the own municipality to their neighbouring 
municipalities when deciding on their vote (Besley & Case, 1995). 
18
 Remark that these economic variables are the result of macro-economic policy which is mainly a federal and 
regional responsibility. Despite their objective to interfere local governments may still have a (marginal) influence 
or may be held accountable by the electorate. Local governments can e.g. approve the layout of additional company 
grounds or decide to lower local company taxes to stimulate local economic activity. 
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electoral losses. A positive effect of the number of government parties on the vote is thus 
expected. The possibility of vote swings between the governments is another possible 
explanation for a positive coefficient. Year dummies are introduced to capture possible year 
effects.19 Descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables are shown in Table A1 in appendix. 
Next we use vote function (2) to predict the vote percentage at upcoming elections. 
Correlation analysis shows that predicted values ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,6− )20 are highly correlated with the actual 
ex-post election results (rp=0,85). Mean value over all election periods is 54,93 which indicates 
that a government on average awaits to get 54,93% of the votes and thus expects to be continued 
in the next legislature.21 Then we transform [ ]tt
itp
V ,6−  by reducing their values with 50 to get 
positive and negative values. [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
22
 is called the expected vote balance as positive values 
express the surplus of expected vote percentage above majority, while negative values express 
the expected shortage of vote percentage to continue the current government.23
  
 
When replacing Dit by [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
 
equation (1) can be written
 
as : 
 
LITit =  β0 + β1 [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
+ β2 Yit + uit ;  (3) 
 
/,7it is the relative change of the local income tax rate in election year t compared to the 
year before. Negative values represent tariff cuts, while the opposite is true for positive values. 
Following PBC and SD models, we do not expect positive values. Table A3 (in appendix) 
SUHVHQWVGHVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVRI /,7it and shows indeed that there are no positive values. On 
average tariffs are cut by 1,02% in election years. Variable Yit in equation (3) stands for 
variables affecting fiscal policy. Although we expect strategic or opportunistic motivations for 
pre-electoral tariff reductions, other motivations could explain tariff reductions. For these 
íPDLQO\ ILQDQFLDOí YDULables we add control variables. E.g. the use of an earlier amassed 
financial surplus could be an explanation for tax reductions. BALANCEit-1 controls for the 
existence of a surplus (positive) or a deficit (negative) in the year before elections. A 
municipality with a surplus in the previous year could opt to transfer this to its taxpayers by 
cutting its tariff.24 A negative sign is thus expected. We also control for the impact of the 
revenue level. REVit is the level of revenues per capita in the year of elections. As the relative 
impact of tariff changes on the total revenue level is smaller the higher the level of revenues, we 
expect a negative sign. We add a variable to control for changes in the taxable income that could 
explain tariff cuts. TIit-1 measures the change of the taxable income during the previous year in 
                                                 
19
 We refer to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) for more information on the vote function and its explanatory variables. 
20
 We add suffix p to indicate that values are predicted. 
21
 We refer to table A2 in appendix for more descriptive statistics on the predicted and actual votes. 
22
 We add suffix -50 to indicate that values are rescaled. 
23
 In research of Solé Ollé (2003) on the relationship between tax mimicking and electoral accountability we find 
“ electoral margin”  as a comparable variable. Also Case (2001) and Caplan (2001) have a similar variable. Unlike 
our attempt to estimate the incumbent’ s expectation, their electoral margin is calculated on past electoral margin 
data as a proxy for the electoral margin expected by the incumbent. 
24
 Contrary a deficit in a previous year could be financed by raising taxes in the year thereafter. 
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percentage of the taxable income of the year before that. If the taxable income increases, a tariff 
cut could be expected, so a negative sign is awaited. Besides financial reasons we can also think 
of political motivations to reduce the LIT tariff before elections. Since the theory of the PBC 
shows that manipulation of policy may be easier for strong, one-party governments and become 
more difficult the larger the number of parties, we add the number of parties of the current 
government (NPARit) as explanatory variable. More fragmented governments are expected to be 
less susceptible to pre-electoral tax reductions, thus we expect a negative coefficient (Geys, 
2007). Population size (POPit) is introduced to control for the size of the municipality. Small 
municipalities are expected to cut more easily taxes as large municipalities are confronted with 
higher expenses (Ashworth et al., 2005) and thus have less financial margin to cut taxes. We 
thus expect a positive sign. Finally inclusion of the year-specific dummies (D1994 and D2000) 
allows us to control for year-specific effects. When we replace Yit in equation (3) with these 
control variables25, equation (3) can be written as :  
 
LITit = β0 + β1 [ ]ttitpV ,650 −−  + β2 BALANCEit-1 + β3 REVit + β4 TIit-1 + β5 NPARit +          
β6 POPit + β7 D1994 + β8 D2000 + uit   (4) 
 
4.4 Results 
 Table 1 and Table 2 present the results of estimations (2) and (4).  We show regressions 
including all variables tested as well as more efficient regressions in which insignificant 
variables are left out. Both models contain a linear regression on panel data with fixed effects 
and covers data from 688 observations26. For both models we also considered pooled linear 
regression and panel data analysis with random effects. Formal tests confirm the use of a panel 
data model with fixed effects. Restricted F-tests rejected the use of pooled linear regressions27, 
while Hausman-tests (p < 0,01) reject twice the 0-hypothesis that fixed effects and random 
effects estimators do not differ substantially. By consequence models with fixed effects are 
preferable (Gujarati, 2003, 268, 651).  
 
                                                 
25
 Descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables are shown in table A3 in appendix. 
26
 For remarks on the composition of the dataset we refer to footnote 16. A t-test shows that average LITit does not 
differ significantly between the sample and the omitted observations (t = 1.091 and p = 0.275). 
27
 F≅2.12 for the vote function model and F≅4.11 for the estimation of LITit . 
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Table 1 : Panel regression estimation results of the vote-function 
Dependent variable : [ ]ttitV
,6−
 
All variables Significant variables 
[ ]tt
itV
,6
6
−
−
 
0.541202*** (10.00937) 0.537021*** (10.04166) 
EXPit -3.709042 (-0.678441) - 
NEXPit 6.802067 (0.910847) - 
INCit -0.603609 (-0.343501) -1.692760*** (-3.955160) 
UNEMPLit 30.71368 (0.473219) - 
NPARit 7.141676*** (7.445654) 7.215794*** (7.723841) 
D1994 -1.254246 (-0.668628) - 
D2000 -2.043619 (-0.574095) - 
Intercept 14.22952 (1.452019) 22.27041*** (6.403603) 
R² 0.726792 0.725607 
Adjusted R² 0.513746 0.517882 
F-statistic28 (p-value) 3.411435 (<0.01) 3.493116 (<0,01) 
Hausman (p-value) 64.777084 (<0.01) 63.321776 (<0.01) 
N 688 
Number of cross sections 294 
Time series length 3 
Note : Values in parentheses are t-values (except for F-statistic and Hausman test, where p-values are presented); * 
significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the vote-function estimation. The last column of table 1 presents 
the most efficient estimation and shows that the lagged vote percentage ( [ ]ttitV ,66−− ), the income 
variable (INCit) and the number of parties (NPARit) have a significant impact on the vote 
percentage of government parties. All three variables are significant at the 1% level. The sign of 
INCit  is opposite to the expectations. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) explain this negative sign by 
refering to the “ clientele hypothesis”  that could explain that at lower levels of per capita income, 
voters tend to stay with or go back to traditional government parties (Rattinger, 1981, 1991). 
The lack of impact of the expenditure variables could be due to the fact that the level of 
expenditures is not a good measure of the quality of the public output. Voters do not hold local 
governments responsible for macro-economic policy, which is indeed a federal responsibility. 
We find no significant impact of the unemployment rate on the vote percentage of local Flemish 
governments. 
 
                                                 
28
 F-statistic tests the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients in a regression are zero. If the p-value –the 
marginal significance level of the F-test- is below the significance level that is testing –which is the case–, the 0-
hypothesis that alle slope coefficients are zero is rejected. 
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Table 2 : Panel regression estimation results of the tariff cut function 
Dependent variable : LITit All variables Significant variables 
[ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
 0.001461 (2.492630)** 0.001374 (2.334225)** 
BALANCEit-1 -4.88E-6 (-3.278626)*** -5.61E-6 (-4.076637)*** 
REVit 6.05E-7 (0.833663) - 
TIit-1 0.179404 (2.228890)** - 
NPARit -0.029115 (-3.607662)*** -0.029217 (-3.602896)*** 
POPit 3.80E-6 (1.007728) 6.84E-6 (1.987590)** 
D1994 0.001908 (0.251013) - 
D2000 0.011137 (03932349) 0.009304 (2.162363)** 
Intercept -0.139658 (-1.863225)* -0.162288 (-2.325653)** 
R² 0.649807 0.643028 
Adjusted R² 0.375306 0.368150 
F-statistic (p-value) 2.367233 (<0.01) 2.339321 (<0.01) 
Hausman (p-value)   
N 688 
Number of cross sections 294 
Time series length 3 
Note : Values in parentheses are t-values (except for F-statistic and Hausman test, where p-values are presented); * 
significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
  
Table  SUHVHQWV WKH UHVXOWV RI WKH HVWLPDWLRQ RI LITit. The most efficient estimation 
makes clear that the expected vote balance ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
), the financial balance (BALANCEit-1), 
the number of coalition parties (NPARit) and the number of inhabitants (POPit) are significant at 
least at the 5% level and all have the expected sign. Dummy variable D2000 indicates that year 
specific effects play a role in 2000.  
The expected vote balance variable [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
 is significant at the 5% level (0,0201) and 
positive which leads us to conclude that tax behaviour in election years indeed depends on the 
government’ s prospects of the electoral results. The sign is positive which suggests that 
governments prospecting no majority ( [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
<0) decide to cut their tariff  LITit<0). This is 
in line with the theoretical expectations. The higher the expected shortage of votes to reach 
majority, the higher the tax cuts and, if re-election indeed does not follow, the higher the impact 
on next government’ s policy-making. This could be explained from strategic motivations (SD 
models). The positive coefficient also indicates that governments expecting a majority 
( [ ]tt
itp
V ,650
−
−
>0) do not cut taxes  LITit≥0)29 before elections. This is reasonable as this would 
reduce current and/or future spending or would need a future tariff increase, which is unlikely as 
this reduces the government’ s popularity.  
                                                 
29
 Our dataset shows that no Flemish municipality increased its tariff in election years. 
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BALANCEit-1 also shows the expected (negative) sign. Governments with a surplus the 
year before elections seem to offset tax rates with this positive balance. As expected NPARit has 
a negative sign suggesting that tariff cuts are more difficult to decide the more government 
parties have to agree. Finally POPit presents a positive sign and confirms that smaller 
municipalities more easily cut tariffs. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
 
There is a lot of empirical evidence that supports the theory of the political budget cycle. 
Contrary to the bulk of the literature that examines expenditures, deficits or debt, this paper 
looks for the existence of a political tariffs cycle. Tariff cuts can be expected before elections, 
not only from a PBC point of view, but also relying on the theory of the strategic use of debt.  
Except for a limited number of papers there is very little known about the determinants 
of tariff cuts. We can only refer to Mikesell (1978), Nelson (2000) and Binet & Pentecôte 
(2004). Our analysis contributes to this research by stressing the role of the government’ s 
prospects of getting into office again. We introduce the expected vote percentage at the next 
elections as an explanatory variable for tariff changes in election years. Our model makes use of 
predictions derived from a vote function as a proxy for electoral outcome expectations. The 
empirical analysis shows that in election years prospects of the electoral results are decisive for 
local tax rate changes. Our results suggest that governments expecting to loose a majority 
position are more prone to cutting the tariffs of the local income tax.  
The empirical analysis shows that the expectation of being a member of the next 
majority is indeed related to the magnitude of the local income tax tariff cuts in election years. 
Still we are conscious of the fact that our results are exploratory. We are aware of the fact that 
the expected vote balance is only a proxy to measure for the government’ s prospects. It might be 
more convenient to collect survey data about the perceived survival probability in future election 
years. Further options for future research are to verify the robustness of our model by testing the 
model using a dataset characterized by a larger time horizon and other tax instruments. Another 
challenge could be the enlargement of the model with non-election years to look for real cyclic 
behaviour. Our results (of election years only) only suggest the existence of cyclic behaviour. 
An extension with non-election years would also permit to control for partisan influences as 
fiscal post election reactions would become perceptible in the model.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6−
 
[ ]tt
itV
,6
6
−
−
 
EXPit NEXPit INCit UNEMPLit NPARit 
mean 54.9334 56.2400 0.6679 0.6907 5.4918 0.0272 1.6294 
median 54.0441 55.0833 0.6189 0.6672 5.4514 0.0237 2.0000 
maximum 87.3000 88.2900 2.1809 1.8196 8.8819 0.0764 5.0000 
minimum 24.1543 37.2478 0.2327 0.4176 3.2060 0.0063 1.000 
std. dev. 10.1811 8.3241 0.2453 0.1684 0.9614 0.0132 0.6809 
observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
 
  
per capita in 
1000 euro 
per capita in 
1000 euro 
per capita in 
1000 euro 
  
 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Predicted vote Actual vote 
 correlation 0.8518 
 mean  54.9334  54.9334 
 median  54.5724  54.0441 
 maximum  81.2700  87.3000 
 minimum  24.6000  24.1543 
 std. dev.  8.6725  10.1811 
 observations  688  688 
 
Table A3 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
All econometric and statistical analyses are performed with Eviews 5.1. 
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 BALANCEit-1 REVit TIit-1 NPARit POPit 
mean -0.0102 4.9334 1094.1132 25338.6582 0.0646 1.6294 18570.6613 
median 0.0000 4.5724 1026.6261 24194.7814 0.0606 2.0000 12754 
maximum 0.0000 31.2700 7063.4083 77105.1910 0.1585 5.0000 476044 
minimum -0.8333 -25.4000 -6981.8358 9035.8263 -0.0643 1.0000 964 
std. dev. 0.0524 8.6725 1625.5049 9375.4852 0.0303 0.6809 26441.6719 
observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
   
per capita in 
BEF 
per capita in 
BEF 
   
